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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------0------
DIANNA LYNN JORGENSON (OVARD) 
-vs.-
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
Supreme Court No. 15434 
JAMES SCOTT JORGENSON, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
------0------
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
------0------
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action based upon mutual Petitions for 
Modification filed by each party pursuant to a preceding 
divorce action. As pertinent to this appeal, appellant (roother) 
sought the imposition of more restrictive child visitation 
while respondent (father) sought a more definite statement of 
his rights of visitation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon a full hearing of the lower court, the Petition 
of appellant, as it pertains hereto, was denied while respond-
ent's Petition, with modifications, was granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's 
ruling in its entirety. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
That parties hereto were divorced in 1972. The 
Decree therein granting custody of the parties' minor child 
to appellant with respondent being awarded reasonable rights 
of visitation. (R. pg. 17). 
Subsequent to the divorce of the parties, defendant 
began to experience difficulty in exercising his visitation 
(T. 107-110). That difficulty resulted in defendant initia-
ting three seperate court proceedings in order to enforce 
his visitation (R. 11, 24, 61-63). At the first hearing, 
the parties were ordered to avail themselves of counseling 
in order to facilitate visitation (R. 19). The second hear-
ing resulted from plaintiff's failure to comply with the 
recommendations of the Court (R. 23). At the second hearing, 
the Court set forth temporary visitation with the direction 
that the parties endeavor to increase the extent of the vis-
itation by defendant (R. 26). At the third hearing, again 
as a result of plaintiff's denial of reasonable visitation, 
the Court ordered extremely specific visitation to defendant 
and, in light of plaintiff's past performance, made visita-
tion an integral requirement of chi.ld support obligations .(R. 67-70 
The courts have unanimously upheld the visitation rights of 
the defendant and have, in fact, encouraged an increase of 
visitation (T. 12). This in spite of the fact that plaintiff 
presented a Dr. Bernell Christensen at the third hearing who 
-2-
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recommended that defendant be deprived of visitation for at 
least six more years. (T. SO) 
Plaintiff, since the parties divorce, has consis-
tently frustrated the rights of the defendant, and has main-
tained an attitude contrary to the best interest of the child 
(T. 13-15, T. 20, T. 22, T. 25, T. 27, T. 28, T. 29, T. 32, 
T. 42, T. 89, T. 107-110, and T. 152). Throughout the trial 
of this matter, no evidence was ever produced to show defend-
ant was other than a normal father (T. 59, 63, 124) and the 
Court so found. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN AWARDING VISITATION 
OF THE MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT 
It cannot be gainsaid that the best interest and 
welfare of the minor child constitutes the primary concern 
and guiding principle in the award of visitation of a child 
caught in the turbulance of divorce. 
The _legislature of this state has enunciated that 
policy in §30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads: 
" ... Visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents and other relatives 
shall take into consideration the 
welfare of the child." 
That doctrine has been followed by this Court in 
its decisions. See Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P. 2d 
550 (1949); Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418 
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(1956); Johnson ''. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P. 2d 16 
(1958); Hyde v. Hyde, 22 Utah 2d 429, 454 P. 2d 884 (1969); 
Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 517 P. 2d 1019 (1974); 
and Mecham v. Mecham, 544 P. 2d 479 (1975). 
It is no less well settled that the trial court's 
decision as to children will not be disturbed unless it is 
clear that a breach of discretion occurred at the lower 
level. Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P. 2d 931 
(1958); Sartain v. Sartain, 15 Utah 2d 198, 389 P. 2d 1023 
(1964). The reason for the "infallibility" rule is that the 
trial court is in an advantaged position to observe the 
demeanor of the witnesses and form opinions. As stated in 
Sampsell supra, at 115 Utah 80: 
"The trial judge had the oppor-
tunity, as we do not, of seeing 
the parties and the witnesses, 
of observing their demeanor, 
and of forming opinions." 
And in Hyde supra, the court reiterated that con-
cept wherein it states at 454 P. 2d 885: 
"The trial lasted several days, and 
since both parties testified in open 
court and were present during the 
taking of the testimony of other wit-
nesses, the trial judge was in a much 
better position to determine the 
question of fitness of the parties to 
have custody than are we who are 
limited to the reading of the record. 
He had the advantage of observing the 
behavior of the parties and could, 
therefore, better judge the emotional 
stability of each, than we can." 
-4-
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In addition, appellant would apparently have mat-
ters of this nature determined by psychiatrists and not in 
the traditional manner (T. 137A-139). However, the Mecham 
case, supra, at 544 P. 2d 481, appears to shed light on not 
only the "infallibility" rule but on the roles of psychia-
trists vis-a-vis the judiciary in making this type of deter-
mination. In that matter, it was held: 
"The court had the benefit of 
testimony of psychiatrists, 
who gave their expert opinions, 
based on the appraisals they 
were able to make of the par-
ties, the minor child, and 
the situation in which they 
were involved. Their opin-
ions are worthy of careful 
consideration by the court, 
but are advisory only, and in 
no sense controlling. The 
parties appeared and testi-
fied. The court had the oppor-
tunity to observe their appear-
ance and demeanor and to 
evaluate to a limited degree 
their personalities, attitudes 
and emotional stability, and 
to make a judgment in reliance 
on all the evidence produced 
at the trial as to what appeared 
to be in the best interest of 
the minor child. The ultimate 
decision was for the trial 
judge, who was in a more favor-
able position than we are to 
weigh the evidence as it came 
from the mouths of the witnesses 
before him, and to make a pro-
per determination of the issues 
presented. 
It is abundantly clear from the record that the 
trial court did carefully weigh and consider the testimony 
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of plaintiff's expert (T. 147 and 152). However, in his 
position, he was able to weigh that testimony in relation-
ship to the testimony of the parties and their demeanor. 
Such consideration should not be disregarded without a sub-
stantial showing of abuse on the part of the trial court. 
In making its order, the Court was obviously concerned about 
the need for respondent to visit with the child and with 
appellent's continually flaunting of the Court's previous 
orders. (T. 22, 42, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153). As a 
result of that concern, the Court properly exercised its con-
siderable equitable powers. This court has affirmed the 
trial court's powers in Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P. 2d 1010 
(1974) at 1014: 
" ... In matters concerning custody 
and support of children, because 
of their highly equitable nature, 
it is appropriate for the trial 
court to take into consideration 
the entire circumstances in mak-
ing any order of enforcement of 
the decree, by contempt or other-
wise, having in mind equitable 
powers, to make any adjustment 
he may think fair and justified." 
The Court was concerned that, because of the his-
tory of this matter, its method of enforcement was proper. 
(T. and 150). Such an order is not without precedence. 
In Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P. 2d 821 (1974), the trlal 
court suspended support payments for lack of visitation. 
In affirming that order, the court said at 822: 
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"That requirement was a condi-
tion precedent to obtaining 
support money, i.e. - the exer-
cise of Mr. Peterson's right to 
see his children. Mrs. Peterson 
had not permitted this, which 
became the basis for her contempt. 
In short, she had not done and in 
not doing equity the while she 
insists on it, by now seeking, 
without any displayed penitence, 
remorse or strings attached, to 
invoke the very jurisdiction of 
the same court that she flouted 
before." 
The facts herein are so similar as to obviate the 
further need for comparison. When the Court is convinced, 
as it is here, that customary methods of enforcement are use-
less, it may impose its considerable discretion to impose a 
method of enforcement that will ensure compliance. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has intentionally and consistently dis-
regarded the orders of the court allowing defendant child 
visitation. Plaintiff has additionally failed at every step 
of these proceedings to show that defendant is anything but 
a normal father in a similar situation. At each proceeding 
the Court has determined that defendant is entitled to visi-
tation and the hearing precipitating this appeal is no excep-
tion. The Court, in attempting to deal with a difficult 
situation has exercised its equitable powers in order to 
enforce its decision as it relates to the best interest and 
welfare of the child, that is, the fostering of a father-son 
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relationship. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 07 # day of 
Mw-~ , 1978. 
/!/ 
STEVEN W. ALLRED 
Attorney for Defendant -
Respondent. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent upon Ray M. Harding, attorney 
for Plaintiff and Appellant, at 59 West Main Street, P.O. 
Box 126, American Fork, Utah 
postage prepaid, this (., --r.4I 
84003, by United States Mail, 
day of MCN J,_ , 1978. 
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